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The literature on digital identity management systems 
(IdM) is abundant and solutions vary by technology 
components and non-technical requirements. In the 
long run, however, there is a need for exchanging iden-
tities across domains or even borders, which requires 
interoperable solutions and flexible architectures. This 
article aims to give an overview of the current research 
on digital identity management. We conduct a system-
atic literature review of digital identity solution archi-
tectures and extract their inherent non-technical as-
sumptions. The findings show that solution designs can 
be based on organizational, business and trust assump-
tions as well as human-user assumptions. Namely, es-
tablishing the trust relationships and collaborations 
among participating organizations; human-users capa-
bility for maintaining private cryptographic material or 
the assumptions that win-win business models could be 
easily identified. By reviewing the key findings of solu-
tions proposed and looking at the differences and com-
monalities of their technical, organizational and social 
requirements, we discuss their potential real-life inhib-




1. Introduction  
 
The problem of a global and universally trusted dig-
ital identity system – or, more specifically, lack of it – is 
a well-known problem. Decades of research have built 
a solid body of knowledge on cryptographic protocols, 
various architectural designs and functioning, yet, dis-
connected infrastructures. While the ultimate goal may 
be to achieve a global internet-based and user-centric 
digital identity solution, having one unique solution ar-
chitecture dominating the global market is highly un-
likely. This means that there will be a need for inter-do-
main integrations. Current and future problem in inte-
grating identity management systems is the myriad of 
service providers (i.e., relying parties) that are not will-
ing (and/or not capable) to implement large modifica-
tions in their systems. The future success of an IdM sys-
tem is dependent on many factors: the solution should 
be technically sound, scalable, economically viable, 
convenient for human-users and what is often omitted in 
many system designs – recognize inter-organizational 
aspects. While considerable research efforts have been 
directed towards enabling the interoperability of tech-
nical components or accommodating usability factors, 
the organizational integration aspect is mostly assumed 
to be achievable and happening in the background. So-
lutions that span across organizational boundaries usu-
ally require changes of various degrees that involve co-
ordinating multiple actors. These inter-organizational 
aspects range from infrastructural, system-level integra-
tions, to higher-level strategic, business, liability aspects 
and trust. Therefore, in this research, we set to investi-
gate the current state of IdM research and to elicit im-
plicit architectural assumptions in the proposed designs. 
To the authors’ best knowledge, digital identity archi-
tectures have been scarcely investigated from the point 
of view of non-technical assumptions.  
Our research question is what are the non-technical 
assumptions in the proposed solutions? From a theoret-
ical perspective, the analysis was inspired by Lago and 
Van Vliet [1] that define three types of architectural as-
sumptions: technical, organizational and managerial. 
The application of their software engineering-specific 
types of assumptions to our analysis, however, was lim-
ited and we employed an inductive approach by deriving 
the dimensions from the data. The following three di-
mensions emerged from our data analysis: the extent of 
infrastructural changes, existence of a trusted party and 
the responsibility of human-user.  
The analysis of sixty-two digital identity designs 
from literature demonstrates that proposed solutions are 
based on assumptions of different types. Some are of or-
ganizational nature that relate to business strategy or in-
frastructural concerns, while others are concerning trust 
and responsibility assumptions that are crucial to the 
wider adoption of the solution proposed. Full trust in a 
third party as the main premise is required in nearly half 
of solution designs. This implies an extensive guardian-





ship of a digital identity by the institution. The remain-
ing half of the reviewed articles is based on human ac-
countability assumptions. Infrastructural changes are 
found to be correlated with either the increased user re-
sponsibility or the existence of a trusted institution. 
Clearly, further research will be needed to investigate 
the relation between reasonable and, on the other hand, 
questionable assumptions that in their essence bridge or 




The main concern of this article is consumer Identity 
Management systems [2], in contrast to enterprise IdM. 
Organizational needs and requirements in IdM are very 
different from requirements for a global, more perma-
nent, digital identity system. Enterprise IdM entails a 
central administrator that manages the needs of an or-
ganization, which initiates and provisions users with 
credentials, and privileges in a company environment. 
The lack of such a central authority makes the problem 
of a ubiquitous digital identity at least more challenging.  
At a meta-level, digital identity ecosystem consists 
of three roles: Identity Provider (IDP), human-user, Re-
lying Party (RP), where each actor has their own set of 
requirements. The RP needs a certain level of assurance 
to provide the service, the human-users want to be in 
control of their personal data, and the IDP requires cer-
tain diligence in the process of handling the data [3].  
The classification of IdM systems has long been ad-
hered to paradigms and models conceptualized in [4]. 
Paradigms refer to implementation and deployment of 
the system and can be network-, service- or user- cen-
tric. Models refer to where identity data are stored and 
delimit the responsibility of each party, such as isolated, 
centralized and federated models [5]. (For more details 
on the paradigms and models see [4]). While the re-
search on user-centric designs has attracted much atten-
tion from researchers and practitioners, many proprie-
tary solutions are based on service-centric paradigms 
(e.g., services from Google, Facebook) and with only 
limited federation of identity data possible (i.e., Single 
Sign-On (SSO) is possible with e.g., Google, but limited 
user control on what data is shared). Existing and func-
tioning networks of identity systems (in research, edu-
cation, companies, countries, etc.) cannot be easily mod-
ified [5]. Thus, the digital identity landscape consists of 
many disintegrated silos of infrastructures and the real 
challenge is to “connect” them and allow the inter-fed-
eration of trust.  
Existing inter-federation architectures – approaches 
that enable multi-party federations – can be grouped into 
three types: hierarchical root of trust, mesh-based and 
proxy federation [3]. Root of trust design enables hier-
archical services, with the most common examples such 
as eduroam – international network access for users in 
research and higher education [6] – and Domain Name 
Service (DNS) [7] – often criticized for its centralization 
drawbacks. Second model is a metadata aggregate pub-
lication (mesh), where federation participants do not 
need to negotiate agreements with each other individu-
ally but agree on a standard contract. The example of a 
mesh-based federation is InCommon – a federation of 
U.S. higher education institutions, which currently has 
approximately 10 million users and 760 educational in-
stitutions. InCommon also has an inter-federation agree-
ment with eduGAIN – the EU higher education federa-
tion [3]. Third, proxy federation service is beneficial to 
RPs and IDPs because it requires only one point of inte-
gration but, on the other hand, implies high dependence 
on the proxy. Here, we refer to the Finnish implementa-
tion of a national eID framework as an example, where 
the role of brokers was introduced as intermediaries be-
tween IDPs and RPs [8].   
In order to build a large-scale inter-federation em-
ploying any of the ecosystem designs above, it takes 
considerable effort to define legal agreements, federa-
tion policies on governance, agree on protocols, data 
structures and vocabularies. Regardless of the multi-
party federation design, the goal is to facilitate and en-
courage integrations. The challenge of building a global 
digital identity system, thus, is an interconnection prob-
lem that requires more attention focused on business, le-
gal, technical, operational and human linkages of its 
components.  
 
2.1. Related Literature 
  
Systematic literature reviews in the domain of IdM 
are very common. Partly, because of the rapid pace of 
technology innovation in the domain, ever changing 
regulatory guidelines and the importance of identity 
management for the functioning of societies. These are 
exemplified in the following works: classification of au-
thentication systems and their usability and drawbacks 
[9], survey of existing authentication methods [10], 
framework for recommendation of authentication 
schemes [11] and a review of authentication using be-
havioral biometrics [12]. Literature reviews on identity 
management have been done from various perspectives, 
such as surveys in the context of Internet of Things [13], 
authentication for e-government services [14], on pri-
vacy preservation [15] and strategies [16], identity and 
access management in cloud environments [17]. With 
regard to more elaborate evaluations, Bonneau et al. 
[18], for instance, proposed a framework for IdM, using 
Usability-Deployability-Security as evaluation proper-
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ties. Their results  and other research on internet pass-
word [19] discuss the difficulties of replacing passwords 
and highlight the research challenges towards designing 
a password-less authentication scheme. Alternatively, 
quantitative and qualitative comparison of IdM architec-
tures were performed using Architectural Tradeoff 
Analysis Method, ATAM [20]. In [20] the authors con-
clude with pointing out the difficulties in consistent 
comparison without solid metrics. In recent years, re-
search on federated IdM architectures has been widely 
investigated, these are federated identity management 
(FIM) in the cloud [21], FIM challenges [22] and secu-
rity issues of FIM in the cloud computing [23]. User-
centric and self-sovereign identity are thought to be next 
phases of internet identity development after FIM [24]. 
Another recent trend in IdM is the application of block-
chain [25]. Hence, publications have appeared in recent 
years e.g., conceptualizing essential components of self-
sovereign identity [26], user-centric identity built on 
blockchain [27] and, counter arguments refuting some 
of widely-held misconceptions on blockchain as a new 
trust mechanism [28]. 
 
2.2. Architecture and assumptions 
  
Making assumptions is an inevitable part of software 
development process. Architectural assumption1 of a 
software system is defined as a statement about uncer-
tain architectural knowledge [30]. Architectures – high-
level conceptions of a system [1] – can be often built on 
design decisions that are based on some knowledge 
taken for granted or accepted as true without evidence 
at the moment. For instance, when a software developer 
makes an educated guess on the priority of require-
ments, or a number of potential users of a system per 
day [30]. These can be the most probable answers that 
are often automatic, unconscious or deliberately pre-
sumed. 
Managing architectural assumptions in software de-
velopment is a critical aspect to the success of any pro-
ject [30]. When assumptions are not met they are found 
to be accounted for project failures [31]. For instance, in 
strategies for tackling assumptions in business plans for 
new ventures [32] assumptions are shown as impedi-
ments in the way of perceiving factual business realities. 
Lago and Van Vliet [1] define three types of architec-
tural assumptions in software engineering: technical, or-
ganizational and managerial. While architectural as-
sumptions have been extensively studied from the per-
spectives of developers and architects at different levels 
and throughout software lifecycle [1], more high-level 
                                                          
1 Assumptions, requirements and constraints are closely related, 
please refer to [29] for detailed definitions. 
assumptions are also worth to be investigated. In this ar-
ticle, we are particularly interested in assumptions at the 
ecosystem level: the interplay between technology and 




This systematic review followed the guidelines for 
conducting literature reviews in software engineering 
[33]. The search was conducted in five databases: IEEE 
Xplorer, ACM Digital Library, Web of Science, Scopus 
and AIS eLibrary. The search string was as follows: 
((digital OR electronic OR online OR federated OR 
self-sovereign OR user-managed) AND identity archi-
tecture). Figure 1 illustrates the process of study selec-
tion steps according to the PRISMA process [34].  
 
Figure 1. Systematic literature review process ap-
plied in this research. 
Article selection requirements were the following: 
central theme is digital/electronic identity management; 
articles are peer-reviewed and discuss/propose a con-
crete solution architecture; article is concerned with 
consumer IdM systems i.e., global, internet scale (not 
enterprise IdM & IAM systems); articles are in the field 
of IS, IT, Computer Science research. The scope of the 
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review was limited to the period from 2014 to 2019, for 
a review before 2014 see [35]. Articles describing 
purely formal cryptographic approaches without any ex-
planations of the implications for governance, pro-
cesses, or deployment requirements were excluded. 
Doctoral dissertations, master’s theses, textbooks, and 
non-peer-reviewed papers were also ignored. 
 
3.1. Assumptions extraction and synthesis 
 
We reviewed 62 articles one by one to identify their 
explicit and implicit assumptions in the designs de-
scribed. We searched for indications of assumptions, 
limitations, constraints, challenges, requirements, and 
inhibitors in the articles. We created and followed a re-
view protocol, which ensured that the evaluation of the 
articles was fair and the methodology is trustworthy, rig-
orous, and auditable  [36].  
In software engineering, widely used classes of ar-
chitectural assumptions [1] are technical (the technical 
environment in which a system is going to run), organ-
izational (refers to the company developing the system 
or using it, its social settings and principles) and mana-
gerial assumptions (refers to business decisions and 
strategies to achieve objectives). While using these three 
categories as the initial schema, the assumptions elicita-
tion process in this study became very soon a bottom-up 
one, i.e., we identified the assumption categories induc-
tively from the data. Hence, the categories are: (A) the 
relation to legacy infrastructure, (B) the existence of a 
trusted third party institution, and (C) the increased hu-
man-user’s responsibility. The article analysis data can 
be accessed online2. Each article was assessed whether 
it corresponds to the category in a binary manner: TRUE 
or FALSE.  
For example, the solution in paper *[9] requires in-
tegrations with additional backend nodes and push mes-
sage services (changes to legacy infrastructure –TRUE), 
implies a greater dependence on Certificate Authorities 
apart from a trusted IDP (existence of a trusted third 
party institution – TRUE). The authors also state that, 
“The private key SK never leaves the [IdM wallet app]”, 
which implies an increased user responsibility (TRUE). 
Another example, the architecture in paper *[20] is 
based on Namecoin blockchain (TRUE), the proposed 
scheme is outside the control of any single entity 
(FALSE) and the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is 
used to publish the user profiles where the ownership is 
associated with a possession of a corresponding private 
key (TRUE). The architecture in paper *[39] proposes 
the use of the Open Algorithms (OPAL) paradigm in 
federations. This requires that a trust framework, which 
                                                          
2 Article list in ascending numerical order can be found following this 
link: https://tinyurl.com/y4pa8cvf 
requires changes to existing operations (TRUE), gov-
erns the operational aspects of the federation. The archi-
tecture employs a gateway entity that coordinates que-
ries and responses (TRUE) but the architecture has no 
new specifications for user-side (FALSE), apart from 




Assumptions elicitation resulted in the following di-
mensions. A (blue) – whether the solution requires a 
change to infrastructural components, and/or a com-
pletely new infrastructure; B (pink) – whether the solu-
tion implies a trusted third party (trusted intermediary, 
semi-trusted agents); C (lilac) – whether the solution as-
sumes the users are ready to take more control and re-
sponsibility over “something they have”, or requiring an 
increased user understanding and training. Figure 2 
demonstrates the articles distribution that belong to di-
mensions described. 
 
Figure 2. Venn diagram grouping articles according 
to assumption categories. 
General assumptions, i.e., not IdM-specific, that 
were extracted vary from having no discussions on po-
tential actors involved and their motivations in partici-
pating, to the ones that propose involving new agencies 
that are close to the user, such as insurance companies, 
banks, postal offices and local shops (e.g., paper *[38]) 
for identity provisioning. The number of articles that ex-
plicitly discuss adoption by providers (e.g., paper *[40]) 
is low. A viable economic model and considerations on 
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the incentives for the participation are crucial in attract-
ing private sector. Table 1 lists the compilation of as-
sumptions found.  
Table 1 A list of assumptions.  
General Assumptions: Sources  
Uptake and support of the solution by 
organizations, users and governments. 
Nearly all 
articles 
Once adopted in an e-government sce-
nario the same technology will spread 
to other consumer cases (if the solu-
tion is in e-government context).  
*[8], *[60], 
*[16] 
Easy and cost-efficient distribution of 
tokens (if the solution implies tokens). 
*[6], *[19] 
The process of digital identity provi-




orations are achievable. 
*[53], 
*[10], *[15] 
Sustainable business models exist; 
new model brings cost savings. 
*[14], 
*[38], *[46] 
A: Relation to Legacy Infrastruc-
tures: 
 
It is trivial to make integrations with 
e.g., IDPs and RPs.  
*[50], *[47] 
Scalability is achievable. *[8], *[18], 
*[20] 
The proposed governance structure is 
feasible. 
*[24], *[39] 
B: Trusted Institution:  
A Trusted third party (TTP) can be 
trusted (e.g., unlinkability of identities 
is guaranteed, key recovery not possi-
ble). TTPs are the intermediary insti-
tutions, except Identity Provider, such 
as manufacturers of secure hardware 
(e.g., Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM), Trusted Execution Environ-





C: Human-User’s Responsibility:  
Users understand the importance of 
not compromising the security.  
*[6], *[20], 
*[57] 
Users would like to use their 
smartphones as security tokens. 
*[5], *[32], 
*[43] 
Smartphones are secure and used as a 
single repository for data. 
*[7], *[13], 
*[29] 
Users vouch to keep their tokens safe. *[9], *[12] 
The final list of articles consists of journal articles 
(N=16) and conference publications (N=46). The arti-
cles distribution by publication year is 2014 (15%), 
2015 (15%), 2016 (19%), 2017 (31%), 2018 (20%). In 
relation to their contexts, articles could be grouped as e-
government (N=18), Federated Identity Management 
(FIM, N=17), cloud IdM (N=14), smartphone-centric 
(N=11), blockchain (N=10), self-sovereign identity 
(SSI, N=6) and TPM or TEE (N=6). Nearly all studies 
are based on a common set of established technologies 
such as SAML, OpenID Connect, Web SSO, FIDO. One 
challenge with this is that FIM frameworks and proto-
cols rely on static trust agreements and do not scale eas-
ily. On the other hand, articles within e-government 
and/or EU scope are mature and tend to investigate the 
inter-federation prospects. They are, however, limited in 
their scope to public service use cases. The majority of 
such works are in EU cross-border context (e.g., 
STORK project), public services in e-government re-
lated services, or specific domain contexts such as aca-
demic research collaborations (e.g., eduGAIN). 
 
4.1. Relation to legacy infrastructure 
 
In relation to existing IdM infrastructures, articles 
can be grouped to those proposing changes of various 
degrees in legacy infrastructures, such as improvements 
of PKI, or mechanisms for managing untrusted IDPs 
such as Google, Facebook, etc. Others propose that there 
is a need for completely new infrastructures such as pri-
vate or public blockchains. This is illustrated by paper 
*[46], which describes an approach of a shared Know 
Your Customer (KYC) infrastructure among banks and 
regulators. However, according to previous research 
[37], such initiatives in making financial institutions 
work together involve complex and lengthy negotia-
tions. Integration efforts and complexity [38] are ad-
dressed explicitly in only few articles. Even though, ul-
timately, the “winner” models should be integrated into 
existing infrastructures without significant changes. 
Low-level infrastructural aspects such as deploy-
ment, storage and performance issues are investigated 
the most in articles within the domain of distributed 
cloud computing. Articles that focus on cross-cloud in-
frastructural interoperability try to address the issues of 
identity and access management (IAM) and attributes 
sharing (e.g., paper *[33]). For example, trust negotia-
tion mechanisms was proposed based on reputation 
(e.g., paper *[48]), but this and related cloud-labeled ar-
ticles are still based on some kind of pre-existing rela-
tionships such as a commercial organization with multi-
ple branches in geographically diverse locations, or as-
sume access to the performance history of a remote IDP. 
Articles tackling authentication and authorization in 
cloud environment often try to adapt IdM & IAM from 
enterprise world. Such solutions, however, require more 
consolidated approach and cannot be so easily ab-




4.2. Trusted institutions 
 
Articles that belong to this dimension are based on 
one or more trust anchors. These can be intermediaries 
that operate federation metadata, proxies, trusted hard-
ware providers or personal data store agents. A trusted 
third party is an institution that facilities the process; or 
operates a software service that manages things on be-
half of the user (e.g., in paper *[58] Dropbox, and 
Google Drive are used as personal data stores). Given 
the involvement of a TTP in an IdM scheme, complex 
governance techniques, including standards, best prac-
tices, and auditing must be managed. Building and op-
erating TTPs is also costly and TTPs are subject to lia-
bilities. Nevertheless, articles especially in the e-gov-
ernmental context stress the need for operating a gov-
ernmental TTP. Centralized designs, surprisingly, can 
also be found in a number of articles (e.g., the design in 
paper *[45] comprises of one central IDM server, mo-
bile device and a cloud server).  
There are at least two outlooks on the role of a 
trusted institution in the functioning of a digital identity. 
Studies supporting true self-sovereignty reject the in-
volvement of any TTP (as in Pretty Good Privacy, PGP) 
and their opponents advocate TTP’s inevitable need. 
The latter stance on self-sovereignty permits the use of 
self-attested attributes such as user preferences, but re-
quires other claims to be verifiable [39]:  
“Trustworthy identity depends on jointly-issued cre-
dentials, where credentials and certification must be 
based on trustworthy assertions by the community of 
people and institutions in which we live. Identity creden-
tials are […] not self-certifying systems.” 
As discussed elsewhere [40], current attempts at cre-
ating self-sovereign identity solutions (e.g., paper *[30] 
– Sovrin, paper *[58], paper *[61]), while being distrib-
uted and resistant to single entity control, are still logi-
cally centralized and fail to provide a true autonomy. 
This indicates that conceptually, some degree of central-
ization is unavoidable (i.e., IDPs), and the question is 
how to balance the centralization in the overall architec-
ture.  
 
4.3. Human-user’s responsibility 
 
At the other end of trust-in-institution spectrum, 
there is human-users’ readiness and/or willingness to 
take responsibility over their digital identity. Here, we 
refer to designs where, for example, smartphones are at 
the center to operate credential wallets (IdM mobile ap-
plications), hardware modules or physical eID cards, for 
securely storing and accessing sensitive cryptographic 
key material, and other private data that users must keep 
secure. Advocacy for full human-user control essen-
tially requires users to understand the importance of, 
e.g., safekeeping the keys or managing backups. 
Nearly all articles emphasize the need for designing 
human-centric IdM architectures. Selective disclosure 
and pseudo-anonymization of personal data and design 
patterns with the master key pair and RP-specific keys 
are also commonly agreed patterns in the articles re-
viewed. In pseudonyms use, key management is under 
control of users to various extents. As articulated in [40], 
the reliance on a single key-pair in day to day operations 
is not optimal, there should be something-that-the-user- 
has, that users should keep safe and use to generate as 
many other key pairs as needed. This brings human-us-
ers full control over their interactions but also highlights 
the importance of self-accountability. 
Furthermore, human-centric digital identity problem 
becomes a problem of a personal data wallet. Once at-
testations are in the wallet, the user should be able to use 
them freely with any RP. As any innovation at an early 
stage, digital wallets require many iterations of trials and 
errors. While being an important idea, such capabilities 
require immense paradigm shifts among organizations 
that currently operate data in silos. The rationale of 
cryptographic operations, such as the importance of un-
derstanding that the system implies no backdoor access 
or understanding the consequences of losing hardware 





Research on identity management today encom-
passes various forms of identity systems: distributed, 
decentralized and user-centric, user-managed, human-
friendly, self-sovereign. Generally, current research is 
concerned more on personal data sharing or attribute-
based mechanisms rather than traditional authentication 
problems. This may indicate the interest shift from the 
area of cryptographic schemes for authentication to-
wards data sharing mechanisms.  
By explicating non-technical assumptions from arti-
cles, our findings expose some of the fundamental issues 
potentially inhibiting internet-scale IdM system estab-
lishment. The elicitation of assumptions, which go hand 
in hand with risks, is important because solutions may 
incorporate design choices that are effective from an en-
gineering viewpoint, but less feasible from a business 
perspective. General assumptions identified from this 
review (see Table 1) are the most prevalent and they are 
not IdM domain-specific, i.e., solution designs for prob-
lems in other domains are most likely based on these ge-
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neric assumptions. Almost any new solution design pro-
posed aspires to be accepted by experts, adopted by 
many organizations but only few studies articulate how. 
At the high abstraction level, in order to achieve a 
well-functioning IdM system, human subjects must ei-
ther trust in institutions such as IDPs, stewards, opera-
tors or take more control, and consequently, responsibil-
ity over their digital identity. Most designs are based on 
a trusted third party – excluding a trusted identity or at-
tribute provider – acting on behalf of the human-user. 
This has considerable implications on human-user au-
tonomy, i.e., what is the trust level of human-users to 
agents handling their personal data activities? What are 
the incentives for organizations to give up control?  
In contrast, as illustrated by a smaller number of pa-
pers that do not rely on a TTP, but instead propose a 
solution with an increased human-user responsibility, 
digital identity wallets [42] are thought to be as the next 
milestone in IdM. Although the PGP approach, where 
the human-users have full control over the end-to-end 
interactions, provides and ensures the most security ef-
fectiveness when used correctly, the human component 
integration is usually the weakest link in a security chain 
[43]. While the interactions between (non tech-expert) 
human-users and digital artefacts can be made seamless, 
the fear of the unknown may potentially interfere with 
the solution acceptance. Especially based on modern of-
ferings from, e.g., Google services where the illusion of 
human control is given to users, it is important for new 
truly self-sovereign solutions to help the users to under-
stand the implications. Thus, the goal shall be to in-
crease transparency, make complex cryptographic solu-
tions humane and provide training for ordinary users. 
For example, it is important to dedicate more research 
and development effort on how multiple device support 
and synchronization could work without personal data 
escrow at providers. Or else, in case of future innova-
tions with personal digital wallets, it is crucial for hu-
man-users to understand that the software behind it was 
built by some entity, but the software instantiation and 
the collection of data in it remains a personal asset [42]. 
Relation to legacy infrastructure category of as-
sumptions is of organizational nature and refers to the 
extent of infrastructural changes in existing IdM sys-
tems. Infrastructural changes correlate with either the 
increased user responsibility or the existence of a trusted 
institution. In our review, no designs proposing only 
changes to existing infrastructures were found. Follow-
ing the success of Bitcoin and alike, many propose to 
utilize blockchain as a main enabler for digital identity 
success. However, more research into the usefulness of 
blockchain in IdM is still necessary before obtaining a 
definitive answer. For example, research has found that 
the term blockchain (which is used as a main selling 
point for trust in many solutions reviewed) can rather be 
negatively connoted by human-users  [44]. Implications 
can vary based on the criticality level of assumptions. 
Another way to process the results of this literature re-
view is by interpreting the assumptions as a whole. 
When the authors of articles make a decision, con-
sciously or unconsciously, in favor of a certain design 
choice, for example by using an IdM wallet application 
or introducing new roles, each individual research con-
tributes to the shaping of the discourse and, conse-
quently, failing or pushing the reality of IdM industry to 
change. 
 
5.1. Non-academic solution designs 
 
Here, we include a brief overview of non-academic 
solution architectures that were outside the scope of the 
literature review. We select solutions that, in our per-
spective, represent the contemporary industry develop-
ment to provide a bit more complete perspective on the 
state-of-the-art of IdM. First, it is essential to discuss the 
evaluative study of the Distributed Ledger Technology 
based IdM schemes by Dunphy & Petitcolas [25], where 
they evaluate three representative proposals of decen-
tralized trusted identity and SSI solutions – uPort, Sho-
Card and Sovrin. The full description and detailed com-
parison of solutions can be found in [25]. 
We now discuss their design choices along the three 
assumption categories we identified. While ShoCard so-
lution can be bootstrapped with existing identity docu-
ments, the relying parties must make integrations with 
ShoCard’s centralized servers (Category A – TRUE) – 
intermediary for storing encrypted attributes (Category 
B – TRUE). Human-users are offered to control the cre-
ation and disclosure of their ShoCardIDs via a mobile 
application (Category C – TRUE). However, there is an 
“unclear usability and user understanding of ShoCard 
privacy implications” [25]. uPort is built on Ethereum 
DLT and uses smart contracts to regulate the data oper-
ations and to hold the mapping of uPort identifiers with 
the data itself stored on IPFS infrastructure (TRUE). Its 
key design choice is the lack of a central authority 
(FALSE), but the secret key, for example, that is under 
full control of human-users is kept only on the user’s 
mobile device (TRUE), it supports the social recovery 
protocol (i.e., users must nominate the trustees who can 
vote to replace the public key). Sovrin is an open-source 
solution built on a permissioned DLT and Linux Foun-
dation’s Hyperledger Indy project codebase (TRUE). 
Stewards are the trust anchors that govern the infrastruc-
ture and take part in consensus protocols (TRUE). Hu-
man integration in Sovrin is reported to be remain an 
open issue as the system is at the early development 
phase [25]. Human-users can choose whether to use the 
storage capabilities of their endpoints or, otherwise, 
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must rely on agencies that will act on their behalf 
(TRUE or FALSE).  
Dunphy & Petitcolas [25] conclude that there is an 
inevitable need for some centralization in IdM architec-
tures. This includes the process of identity provisioning, 
backup & recovery of cryptographic keys and secure 
lookup of entities and services. Moreover, our findings 
resonate with their conclusion on the existence of the 
widespread assumption that users are naturally equipped 
with skills to conduct effective cryptographic key man-
agement and understand the implications of distrib-
uted/decentralized/DLT-based data management:  
“Approaches to digital identity that remove central 
authorities and depend upon effective key management 
strategies from its users create the risk that non-tech-
nical users will be alienated by the technology” [25]. 
Another example of privacy-enhancing credentials 
implementation is IBM’s Identity Mixer [45] – a proto-
col suite that provides strong authentication with pri-
vacy-preserving features: anonymity and unlinkability. 
Although the building blocks for Identity Mixer have 
been based on the advanced and mature cryptographic 
schemes (such as selective disclosure by Camenisch & 
Lysyanskaya [46]), the technology was not widely 
adopted due to the deployment complexities (TRUE). 
Although the solution architecture eliminates the need 
for any additional TTPs (FALSE), and hands in a full 
control to the human-user (TRUE), the intricacies of the 
reference implementation required specialized 
knowledge  and understanding of technology  (e.g., de-
velopers and implementers need to learn the specific 
data formats) that hindered the adoption [47]. The ex-
periments with real-world infrastructures as part of EU 
ABC4Trust project revealed the challenges that could be 
grouped into two categories [47]: 
 challenges to enable users to manage their iden-
tities and the identity management process; 
 challenges to encourage the (commercial) usage 
of privacy preserving credentials by relying par-
ties and service providers. 
These challenges are in line with the two assumption 
categories we identified: human-user integration and the 
degree of infrastructural changes.  
Among other examples from the industry are the 
new digital ID from MasterCard3 and Sign in with Ap-
ple4 that put strong emphasis on privacy of personal in-
formation but have inherent design limitation that puts 
these entities at the center managing the digital identity 
network.  
While every non-substantiated assumption should be 
considered as vulnerability, it does not mean that as-
sumptions need to be avoided. Rather, they ought to be 
recognized and explicitly stated. In conclusion, our 
                                                          
3 https://www.wired.com/story/mastercard-digital-id/ 
high-level review of various IdM architectures designs 
shows that solution designs can be based on trust in an 
institution or human-user responsibility along with in-
frastructural deployability assumptions. These assump-
tions have their own implications, and, more im-
portantly, they manifest the research gap. For instance, 
the concept of human-user’s readiness to take responsi-
bility is more than user experience; or that the role of 
various institutions and businesses in IdM is not entirely 
understood. 
 
5.2 Limitations  
 
Our research has limitations. First, our study was 
limited to the research published in the most common 
Information technology (IT) outlets, and does not in-
clude all publication forums (we did not look into pro-
fessional sources, only academic publications). Our 
overview of non-academic solutions in Discussion sec-
tion is rather superficial and was included in an attempt 
to provide pointers for further research. Furthermore, we 
did not perform backward and forward searches as part 
of the snowballing technique. Second, we did not differ-
entiate between different purposes of identity manage-
ment. It is important to note that we employ the digital 
identity solution in its broad scope. This includes strong 
user authentication as well as and single sign-on and 
sharing of attributes in a privacy-friendly way. There 
was neither a differentiation on the security achieved, 
the privacy provided, nor the technology employed. We 
hope that these factors could be taken into account in the 
future work. Third, in present review we focused on 
non-technical assumptions based on the information 
provided in the articles only. In [31], the authors indicate 
the challenges in assumptions recovery from a system 
without having a thorough understanding of the system. 
Therefore, we make a call for future research that may 
entail a deeper inquiry involving interviews of key peo-
ple and stakeholders, and the analysis of documentation. 
Fourth, the generalizability of our findings needs to be 
investigated in future research due to a small sample of 
articles in the analysis. In this study, we focused on three 
types of assumptions. The list is possibly not yet com-




It is widely acknowledged that trust establishment 
plays a key role in scalability of IdM solutions. There is 
a clear need for consolidation of distributed and frag-
mented, currently ongoing and future IdM initiatives. In 
4 https://www.evernym.com/blog/login-with-apple/ 
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this article, we observe that inter-organizational integra-
tions can be the background problem of a ubiquitous 
IdM establishment. Our findings show that various IdM 
designs proposed are in the spectrum of either trust in a 
third-party institution, or full control by the human-user. 
In addition, infrastructural changes proposed also de-
pend on these two assumptions, or a combination of 
both. This indicates that even self-sovereign identity de-
signs, or the use of blockchain in IdM still require some 
kind of trusted agent or the trust in human subject’s re-
sponsibility. We call for future research to bear in mind 
non-technical assumptions and to address their implica-
tions explicitly. For instance, what are the roles in the 
proposed solution? What are the potential organizations, 
and what are the incentives for their participation? Spe-
cifically, what innovative business models are required? 
Why should organizations collaborate and what is the 
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